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ON THE STRENGTH OF DEPENDENT PRODUCTS
IN THE TYPE THEORY OF MARTIN-LO¨F
RICHARD GARNER
Abstract. One may formulate the dependent product types of Martin-Lo¨f type theory
either in terms of abstraction and application operators like those for the lambda-
calculus; or in terms of introduction and elimination rules like those for the other
constructors of type theory. It is known that the latter rules are at least as strong
as the former: we show that they are in fact strictly stronger. We also show, in
the presence of the identity types, that the elimination rule for dependent products –
which is a “higher-order” inference rule in the sense of Schroeder-Heister – can be
reformulated in a first-order manner. Finally, we consider the principle of function
extensionality in type theory, which asserts that two elements of a dependent product
type which are pointwise propositionally equal, are themselves propositionally equal.
We demonstrate that the usual formulation of this principle fails to verify a number
of very natural propositional equalities; and suggest an alternative formulation which
rectifies this deficiency.
1. Introduction
This is the first in a series of papers recording the author’s investigations into the
semantics of Martin-Lo¨f’s dependent type theory; by which we mean the type theory
set out in the expository volume [9]. The main body of these investigations concerns
what the author is calling two-dimensional models of dependent type theory. Recall
that one typically divides the models of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory into extensional and
intensional ones, the former differentiating themselves from the latter by their admission
of an equality reflection rule which collapses the propositional and definitional equalities
of the language into a single, judgemental, equality. The two-dimensional models that
the author is studying are of the intensional kind, but are not wholly intensional: they
admit instances of the equality reflection rule at just those types which are themselves
identity types.
In the process of making his investigations, the author has discovered certain unre-
solved issues concerning the dependent product types of Martin-Lo¨f type theory; and
since these issues exist beyond the domain of two-dimensional models, it seemed worth-
while to collect his conclusions into this preliminary paper.
The first of these issues concerns how we formulate of the rules for the dependent
product types. There are two accepted ways of doing this. In both cases, we begin
with a formation rule which, given a type A and a type B(x) dependent on x : A,
asserts the existence of a type Π(A,B); and an abstraction rule which says that, from
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 03B15.
Key words and phrases. Dependent type theory; dependent products; function extensionality.
Supported by a Research Fellowship of St John’s College, Cambridge and a Marie Curie Intra-
European Fellowship, Project No. 040802.
2 RICHARD GARNER
an element f(x) : B(x) dependent on x : A, we may deduce the existence of an element
λ(f) : Π(A,B). We may then complement these rules with either an application rule,
which tells us that, fromm : Π(A,B) and a : A, we may infer an element app(m,x) : B(x);
or an elimination rule, which essentially tells us that any (dependent) function out of
Π(A,B) is determined, up-to-propositional-equality, by its values on those elements of
the form λ(f) for some dependent element x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x).
There are two problematic features here. The first concerns the nature of the elimina-
tion rule, which is a higher-order inference rule in the sense of Schroeder-Heister [10]. In
order to formulate this rule rigorously, we must situate our type theory within an ambient
calculus possessing higher-order features; a suitable choice being the Logical Framework
described in Part III of [9], and recalled in Section 2 below. Yet it may be that we do
not wish to do this: one reason being that the categorical semantics of Martin-Lo¨f type
theory looks rather different when it is formulated within the Logical Framework. Hence
our first task in this paper is to give a first-order reformulation of the elimination rule
in terms of the application rule and a propositional form of the η-rule; a reformulation
that may be stated without recourse to the Logical Framework.
The second problematic feature concerns the precise relationship between the applica-
tion and elimination rules for dependent products. We know that the application rule
may be defined in terms of the elimination rule, so that the elimination rule is stronger;
yet it is not known whether it is strictly stronger. Our second task is to show that this
is in fact the case; we do this by describing a non-standard interpretation of the Π-types
for which the application rule obtains, yet not the elimination rule.
We then move on to another issue, namely the formulation of the principle of function
extensionality in Martin-Lo¨f type theory. This principle asserts that if m and n are
elements of Π(A,B) and we can affirm a propositional equality between app(m,x) and
app(n, x) whenever x : A, then we may deduce the existence of a propositional equality
between m and n. One result of the author’s investigations has been that, if we are to
obtain a notion of two-dimensional model which is reasonably urbane from a category-
theoretic perspective, then we must impose some kind of function extensionality. Yet
the principle of function extensionality just stated has been found wanting in this regard,
since it fails to provide witnesses for a number of very natural propositional equalities
which are demanded by the semantics; some of which are detailed in Examples 5.6
below. From a category-theoretic perspective, we might say that the principle of function
extensionality fails to be coherent. Our third task in this paper, therefore, is to propose
a suitably coherent replacement for function extensionality.
Acknowledgements. The author wishes to thank Johan Granstro¨m, Per Martin-
Lo¨f, Erik Palmgren, Olov Wilander and other members of the Stockholm-Uppsala Logic
Seminar for useful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. He also
thanks the anonymous referee for several useful comments and suggestions.
2. Martin-Lo¨f type theory
2.1. We begin with a brief summary of the two principal ways in which one may present
Martin-Lo¨f type theory. The more straightforward is the “polymorphic” presentation of
[7, 8]. This is given by a reasoning system with four basic forms of judgement:
• Γ ⊢ A type (“A is a type under the hypothesis Γ”);
• Γ ⊢ a : A (“a is an element of A under the hypothesis Γ);
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• Γ ⊢ A = B type (“A and B are equal types under the hypothesis Γ”);
• Γ ⊢ a = b : A (“a and b are equal elements of A under the hypothesis Γ”).
Here, Γ is to be a context of assumptions, Γ = (x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An−1),
subject to a requirement of well-formedness which affirms that each Ai is a type under
the assumptions (x1 : A1, . . . , xi−1 : Ai−1). The polymorphic presentation of Martin-
Lo¨f type theory is now given by specifying a sequent calculus over these four forms of
judgement: so a number of axiom judgements, together with a number of inference rules
J1 · · · Jn
J
allowing us to derive the validity of the judgement J from that of the Ji’s. As usual, these
inference rules separate into a group of structural rules which deal with the contextual
book-keeping of weakening, contraction, exchange and substitution; and a group of logical
rules, which describe the constructions we wish to be able to perform inside our type
theory: constructions such as cartesian product of types, disjoint union of types, or
formation of identity types.
2.2. However, the polymorphic presentation of type theory will be inadequate for our
purposes, because the elimination rule for dependent products we wish to study requires
the use of a second-order judgement Γ ⊢ J , in which the context of assumptions Γ
itself contains a judgement under hypotheses. One solution to this problem is suggested
by Troelstra and van Dalen in [11, Chapter 11]: we extend our system with explicit
second-order judgement forms expressing that “B is a family of types over A under the
hypothesis Γ”, and so on, and express the elimination rule in terms of these. A second
solution—and the one we adopt here—makes use of the “monomorphic” presentation
of Martin-Lo¨f type theory. This is given in terms of the Logical Framework, which is
essentially a formalisation of the meta-theory we use to reason about the calculus of
types. The basic judgements of this meta-theory look rather like those of type theory:
Γ ⊢ A sort; Γ ⊢ a : A; Γ ⊢ A = B sort; and Γ ⊢ a = b : A.
However, the meaning is somewhat different. We think of a sort of the Logical Framework
as being a category of judgements about type theory. In particular, the Logical Framework
has rules
⊢ type sort
and
A : type ⊢ elA sort
,
which express the existence of the category of judgements “— is a type”; and, under the
assumption that “A is a type”, of the category of judgements “— is an element of A”.
Using these, we may interpret more complex judgements of type theory; for example, if
we know that “A is a type”, then we can interpret the judgement J that “B(x) is a type
under the hypothesis that x is an element of A” as
x : elA ⊢ B(x) : type.
Yet this is not an entirely faithful rendition of J , since strictly speaking, the displayed
sequent asserts the judgement “B(x) is a type” under the hypothesis that “x is an element
of A”. To resolve this, we introduce the other key aspect of the Logical Framework,
namely the function sorts. These are specified by rules of formation, abstraction and
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application:
Γ, x : A ⊢ B(x) sort
Γ ⊢ (x : A)B sort
,
Γ, x : A ⊢ b(x) : B(x)
Γ ⊢ [x : A] b(x) : (x : A)B(x)
and
Γ ⊢ f : (x : A)B Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ f(a) : B(a)
subject to the α-, β-, η- and ξ-rules of the lambda-calculus. Using function sorts, we can
now render the judgement J more correctly. We have the sort (x : elA) type, which is
the category of judgements “— is a type under the hypothesis that x is an element of
A”; and can now interpret J as the judgement
⊢B : (x : elA) type.
2.3. We may translate the polymorphic presentation of Martin-Lo¨f type theory into the
monomorphic one by encoding the inference rules of the former as higher-order judge-
ments of the latter. For instance, consider the hypothetical type constructor Φ with
rules
A type
Φ(A) type
and
A type a : A
φA(a) : Φ(A)
.
We may encode this in the Logical Framework by terms
⊢Φ : (A : type) type and ⊢ φ : (A : type, a : elA) el Φ(A),
where for readability we write iterated function spaces as (A : type, a : elA) el Φ(A)
instead of the more correct (A : type)(a : elA) el Φ(A). Note that this encoding says
more than the original, by affirming a certain insensitivity to ambient context; since
from the constants Φ and φ, we obtain a whole family of inference rules
Γ ⊢ A type
Γ ⊢ Φ(A) type
and
Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ φA(a) : Φ(A)
,
together with further rules expressing stability under substitution in Γ. However, this
is no bad thing, since any acceptable inference rule of the polymorphic theory will pos-
sess this “naturality” in the context Γ. In the remainder of this paper we work in the
monomorphic presentation of type theory, but will take advantage of the above encoding
process in order to present the rules of our type theory in the more readable polymor-
phic style. For more on the relationship between the monomorphic and polymorphic
presentations, see [5].
3. A first-order reformulation of the Π-elimination rule
3.1. Our main concern in this paper is with the dependent product types of Martin-Lo¨f
type theory: but in this analysis, we will from time to time make use of the identity
types, which are a reflection at the type level of the equality judgements a = b : A. We
begin, therefore, by recalling the rules for the identity types:
A type a, b : A
IdA(a, b) type
Id-form;
A type a : A
r(a) : IdA(a, a)
Id-intro;
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A type x, y : A, z : IdA(x, y) ⊢ C(x, y, z) type
x : A ⊢ d(x) : C(x, x, r(x)) a, b : A p : IdA(a, b)
J(d, a, b, p) : C(a, b, p)
Id-elim;
A type x, y : A, z : IdA(x, y) ⊢ C(x, y, z) type
x : A ⊢ d(x) : C(x, x, r(x)) a : A
J(d, a, a, r(a)) = d(a) : C(a, a, r(a))
Id-comp.
The notion of equality captured by the identity types is known as propositional equality :
to say that a and b are propositionally equal as elements of A is to say that we may affirm
a judgement p : IdA(a, b). We think of IdA as being a type inductively generated by the
elements r(a) : IdA(a, a), with the elimination rule and computation rules expressing
that any dependent function out of IdA is determined up-to-propositional-equality by its
value on elements of the form r(a).
3.2. We are now ready to describe the two standard formulations of dependent product
types in Martin-Lo¨f type theory. The first, which we will refer to as the app-formulation,
is analogous to the λ-calculus with the β-rule but no η-rule:
A type x : A ⊢ B(x) type
Π(A,B) type
Π-form;
x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x)
λ(f) : Π(A,B)
Π-abs;
m : Π(A,B) a : A
app(m,a) : B(a)
Π-app;
x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x) a : A
app(λ(f), a) = f(a) : B(a)
Π-β.
Note that, for the sake of readability we omit the hypotheses A type and x : A ⊢B(x) type
from the last three of these rules; and in future, we may omit any such hypotheses that
are reconstructible from the context. To further reduce syntactic clutter, we may also
write Πx : A.B(x) instead of Π(A, [x : A]B(x)); λx. f(x) instead of λ([x : A] f(x)); and
m · a instead of app(m,a).
3.3. As we noted in the Introduction, the second formulation of dependent products—
which we will refer to as the funsplit-formulation—has the same introduction and abstrac-
tion rules but replaces the application and β-rules with elimination and computation rules
which mirror those for the other constructors of type theory: they assert that each type
Π(A,B) is inductively generated by the elements of the form λ(f).
y : Π(A,B) ⊢ C(y) type f : (x : A)B(x) ⊢ d(f) : C(λ(f)) m : Π(A,B)
funsplit(d,m) : C(m)
Π-elim;
y : Π(A,B) ⊢ C(y) type
f : (x : A)B(x) ⊢ d(f) : C(λ(f)) x : A ⊢ g(x) : B(x)
funsplit(d, λ(g)) = d(g) : C(λ(g))
Π-comp.
3.4. Observe that the assumption f : (x : A)B(x) ⊢ d(f) : C(λ(f)) makes the funsplit
rules into higher-order inference rules, which as such are inexpressible in the “polymor-
phic” formulation of type theory. Our task in the remainder of this section will be to
reformulate these rules in a first-order fashion. Our treatment is a generalisation of
that given by Martin-Lo¨f in his introduction to [7], with the major difference that we
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are working in the theory with intensional identity types, as opposed to the extensional
equality types of [7].
3.5. Proposition: (cf. [9, p. 52]) In the presence of the rules Π-form, Π-intro, Π-elim
and Π-comp, the rules Π-app and Π-β are definable.
Proof. Suppose that m : Π(A,B) and a : A. We define a type y : Π(A,B) ⊢ C(y) type by
taking C(y) := B(a); and a term f : (x : A)B(x) ⊢ d(f) : C(λ(f)) by taking d(f) := f(a).
Applying Π-elimination, we define app(m,a) := funsplit(d,m) : B(a). Moreover, when
m = λ(f) we have by Π-comp that app(λ(f), a) = d(f) = f(a), which gives us Π-β as
required. 
3.6. Proposition: (cf. [9, p. 62]) In the presence of the identity types and the rules
Π-form, Π-intro, Π-elim and Π-comp, the following rules are definable:
m : Π(A,B)
η(m) : IdΠ(A,B)
(
m, λx.m · x
) Π-prop-η;
x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x)
η(λ(f)) = r(λ(f)) : IdΠ(A,B)
(
λ(f), λ(f)
) Π-prop-η-comp.
Proof. Given y : Π(A,B), we define a type C(y) := IdΠ(A,B)(y, λx. y · x). In the case
where y = λ(f) for some f : (x : A)B(x), we have C(y) = IdΠ(A,B)(λ(f), λx. λ(f) · x) =
IdΠ(A,B)(λ(f), λx. f(x)) = IdΠ(A,B)(λ(f), λ(f)); consequently, we may define an element
d(f) : C(λ(f)) by d(f) := r(λ(f)). Using Π-elimination, we define η(m) := funsplit(d,m);
and when m = λ(f), we have by Π-comp that η(λ(f)) = d(f) = r(λ(f)) as required. 
3.7. Proposition: In the presence of identity types, the rules Π-form, Π-intro, Π-app
and Π-β, and the rules Π-prop-η and Π-prop-η-comp of Proposition 3.6, the rules Π-
elim and Π-comp are definable.
Proof. We first recall that in the presence of identity types, Π-form, Π-intro, Π-app
and Π-β, we may derive the following “Leibnitz rules”, which assuming A type and
x : A ⊢ B(x) type, say that
a1, a2 : A p : IdA(a1, a2) b2 : B(a2)
subst(p, b2) : B(a1)
Id-subst;
a : A b : B(a)
subst(r(a), b) = b : B(a)
Id-subst-comp;
see [9, p. 59], for example.
So, suppose given judgements A type, x : A ⊢ B(x) type and y : Π(A,B) ⊢ C(y) type
and terms f : (x : A)B(x) ⊢ d(f) : C(λ(f)) and m : Π(A,B). We are required to define
a term funsplit(d,m) : C(m) satisfying funsplit(d, λ(f)) = d(f). We begin by forming the
term
T (d,m) := d
(
[x : A]m · x
)
: C(λx.m · x).
ON THE STRENGTH OF DEPENDENT PRODUCTS 7
By Π-prop-η, we have a term η(m) : IdΠ(A,B)(m, λx.m · x): so by substituting T (d,m)
along η(m) we obtain a term funsplit(d,m) := subst
(
η(m), T (d,m)
)
: C(m) as required.
Moreover, when m = λ(f), we obtain from Π-β that T (d, λ(f)) = d(f), and from
Π-prop-η-comp that η(λ(f)) = r(λ(f)); and so from Id-subst-comp, we deduce that
funsplit(d, λ(f)) = subst
(
r(λ(f)), d(f)
)
= d(f) : C(λ(f))
as required. 
3.8. Thus, in the presence of identity types, the funsplit-formulation of dependent prod-
ucts is equivalent with the app-formulation extended with the propositional η-rule. Note
carefully that this equivalence is a propositional, rather than definitional one; which is
to say that if we are given a funsplit term, to which we apply Propositions 3.5 and 3.6
to obtain terms app and η, and then Proposition 3.7 to obtain a new term funsplit′, we
should not expect funsplit(d,m) = funsplit′(d,m) to hold, but rather only that
y : Π(A,B) ⊢ C(y) type f : (x : A)B(x) ⊢ d(f) : C(λ(f)) m : Π(A,B)
ψ(d,m) : IdC(m)
(
funsplit(d,m), funsplit′(d,m)
)
should be derivable. We may prove this by an application of Π-elim.
4. Π-application does not entail Π-elimination
4.1. We saw in Proposition 3.5 that the funsplit-formulation of dependent products sub-
sumes the app-formulation; and the task of this section is to show that the converse does
not obtain. In the previous section we were proving a positive derivability result, and so
worked in a minimal fragment of Martin-Lo¨f type theory in order to make our result as
strong as possible. In this section, we are proving a negative derivability result: and to
make this as strong as possible, we work in full Martin-Lo¨f type theory. So in addition
to identity types and the app-formulation of dependent products we assume the presence
of dependent sums Σx : A.B(x), the unit type 1, pairwise disjoint unions A + B, the
empty type 0, the W-types, and the first universe U. We refer to the type theory with
these constructors as MLapp. Our main result will be:
4.2. Theorem: Relative to the theory MLapp, the funsplit rules Π-elim and Π-comp are
not definable.
Now, if we could define Π-elim and Π-comp relative toMLapp, then by Proposition 3.6
we would also be able to derive Π-prop-η and Π-prop-η-comp. Consequently, we may
prove Theorem 4.2 by proving:
4.2’. Theorem: Relative to the theory MLapp, the rules Π-prop-η and Π-prop-η-comp
of Proposition 3.6 are not definable.
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4.3. Our method of proving Theorem 4.2’ will be as follows. We first define the following
rules relative to the theory MLapp:
A type x : A ⊢ B(x) type
Π′(A,B) type
Π′-form;
x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x)
λ′(f) : Π′(A,B)
Π′-abs;
m : Π(A,B) a : A
app′(m,a) : B(a)
Π′-app;
x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x) a : A
app′(λ′(f), a) = f(a) : B(a)
Π′-β.
We then show that the corresponding rule Π′-prop-η is not definable; and from this
we deduce that the rule Π-prop-η cannot be definable either, since if it were then by
replacing each Π, λ or app in its derivation with a Π′, λ′ or app′, we would obtain a
derivation of Π′-prop-η, which would give a contradiction.
4.4. In order to define Π′, λ′ and app′, we will need to make use of disjoint union types.
Given typesA andB, their disjoint union is the type A+B with the following introduction
and elimination rules:
a : A
∐1(a) : A+B
+-intro1;
b : B
∐2(b) : A+B
+-intro2;
z : A+B ⊢ C(z) type
x : A ⊢ f(x) : C(∐1(x)) y : B ⊢ g(y) : C(∐2(y)) c : A+B
case(f, g, c) : C(c)
+-elim,
subject to the computation rules case
(
f, g,∐1(a)
)
= f(a) and case
(
f, g,∐2(b)
)
= g(b).
We use disjoint unions to define the Π′-rules as follows.
A type x : A ⊢ B(x) type
Π′(A,B) := Π(A,B) + Π(A,B) type
Π′-form;
x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x)
λ′(f) := ∐1(λ(f)) : Π(A,B) + Π(A,B)
Π′-abs;
m : Π(A,B) + Π(A,B) a : A
app′(m,a) := case(app(–, a), app(–, a), m) : B(a)
Π′-app
where we write app(–, a) as an abbreviation for the term [x : Π(A,B)] app(x, a). To see
that these definitions validate Π′-β, we suppose that f : (x : A)B(x) and a : A; then by
the first computation rule for disjoint unions and Π-β we have that
app′(λ′(f), a) = case
(
app(–, a), app(–, a), ∐1(λ(f))
)
= app(λ(f), a) = f(a)
as required.
4.5. It remains to show that with respect to the above definitions, the rule
m : Π′(A,B)
η′(m) : IdΠ′(A,B)
(
m, λ′x. app′(m,x)
) Π′-prop-η
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cannot be derived. So suppose that it could. Since for each judgement x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x)
we have a term ∐2(λ(f)) : Π
′(A,B), we would obtain from this a derivation of
x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x)
η′(∐2(λ(f))) : IdΠ′(A,B)
(
∐2(λ(f)), λ
′x. app′(∐2(λ(f)), x)
)
.
But now by the definition of app′ we have that
app′(∐2(λ(f)), x) = case(app(–, x), app(–, x), ∐2(λ(f))) = app(λ(f), x) = f(x);
and hence λ′x. app′(∐2(λ(f)), x) = λ
′x. f(x) = ∐1(λ(f)), so that we may view the above
derivation as a derivation of
(⋆)
A type x : A ⊢ B(x) type x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x)
η′(∐2(λ(f))) : IdΠ(A,B)+Π(A,B)
(
∐2(λ(f)), ∐1(λ(f))
)
.
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that no such derivation can exist. The key to
doing so will be the following disjointness rule:
(†)
C type c : C p : IdC+C
(
∐2(c), ∐1(c)
)
θ(c, p) : 0
,
where 0 is the empty type. If we can prove that this holds relative to MLapp, then we
will be able to deduce the underivability of (⋆). Indeed, suppose that (⋆) holds. Then
from this and (†) we can derive the following rule:
x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x)
θΠ(A,B)
(
λ(f), η′(∐2(λ(f)))
)
: 0
;
and by instantiating this derivation at some particular A, B and f—a suitable choice
being A := 1, B := 1 and f := [x : 1]x—we obtain a global element of 0. But this is
impossible, because MLapp is known to be consistent, in the sense that 0 has no global
elements. An easy way of seeing that this is the case is by exhibiting a consistent model
for MLapp using the sets in our meta-theory. We interpret types as sets; dependent sums
and products as indexed sums and products; identity types as meta-theoretic equality;
the terminal type as a one-element set and the empty type as the empty set. The inter-
pretation of W-types and the first universe is a little more complex, and depends upon
the existence of inductive datatypes in our meta-theory, but is essentially unproblematic.
4.6. All that remains to complete the proof of Theorem 4.2’ is to show that the disjoint-
ness rule (†) is derivable in MLapp. This follows by a standard argument (cf. [9, p. 86]).
Recall that one of the type constructors in MLapp was that for the universe type [9,
Chapter 14]. This is a type U containing “codes” for each of the other type formers of
MLapp. In particular, we have rules
0ˆ : U
U-intro1 and
1ˆ : U
U-intro2
introducing codes for the empty type and the terminal type. Recall also that U comes
equipped with a decoding function D which is given by an indexed family of types
x : U ⊢ D(x) type
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together with computation rules which determine the value of D on canonical elements
of U. In particular, we have rules
D(0ˆ) = 0 type
U-comp1 and
D(1ˆ) = 1 type
U-comp2.
So suppose now that C type, c : C and p : IdC+C
(
∐2(c), ∐1(c)
)
as in the premisses of (†).
We are required to derive an element of 0. We begin by defining functions
x : C ⊢ f(x) := 0ˆ : U and x : C ⊢ g(x) := 1ˆ : U.
Applying +-elimination to these we obtain a function case(f, g, –): C+C → U; and using
the decoding function D on this we obtain a family
z : C + C ⊢ T (z) := D
(
case(f, g, z)
)
type.
Now from the rule Id-subst defined in Proposition 3.7, together with the given proof
p : IdC+C
(
∐2(c), ∐1(c)
)
we obtain the term
x : T (∐1(c)) ⊢ subst(p, x) : T (∐2(c)).
But we have that T (∐1(c)) = D(f(c)) = D(0ˆ) = 0 and that T (∐2(c)) = D(g(c)) =
D(1ˆ) = 1, so that we may view this as a function x : 1 ⊢ subst(p, x) : 0. In particular, by
evaluating this function at the canonical element ⋆ : 1 we obtain an element subst(p, ⋆) : 0
as required. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2’.
5. Function extensionality
5.1. In this final section, we investigate the principle of function extensionality in Martin-
Lo¨f type theory, which asserts that two elements of a dependent product type which are
pointwise propositionally equal, are themselves propositionally equal. Explicitly, it is
given by the following two inference rules:
m, n : Π(A,B) k : Πx : A. IdB(x)(m · x, n · x)
ext(m,n, k) : IdΠ(A,B)(m,n)
Π-ext,
f : (x : A)B(x)
ext
(
λ(f), λ(f), λ(rf)
)
= r(λ(f)) : IdΠ(A,B)(λ(f), λ(f))
Π-ext-comp,
where we write rf as an abbreviation for the term [x : A] rf(x). These rules were con-
sidered first by Turner in [12] and then more extensively by Hofmann [4]. If one views
Martin-Lo¨f type theory as a computational system, in which terms are thought of as
algorithms—an idea made precise in [9, Appendix B], for example—then these rules are
hard to justify, since two extensionally equal functions can have quite different algorith-
mic content. From a proof-theoretic perspective they are also problematic, since they
destroy one of the more pleasant properties of Martin-Lo¨f type theory, namely that in
the syntactic model, every global element of a closed type is definitionally equal to a
canonical element.1 On the other hand, they do not break strong normalisation, so that
if we view type theory merely as a computable system—one for which the correctness
of derivations is decidable—then their addition is unproblematic, and in fact produces
a system which is closer to the “everyday” mathematics described by extensional type
1Though a construction of Altenkirch [1] shows that there are models validating both function exten-
sionality and the canonicity property.
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theory. Indeed, Hofmann [3] shows that augmenting intensional type theory with func-
tion extensionality and the principle of uniqueness of identity proofs—which asserts that
any two proof-terms p, q : IdA(a, b) are themselves propositionally equal—yields a sys-
tem which, whilst still decidable, is propositionally equivalent (in the sense of §3.8) to
extensional type theory.
The author’s motivations for studying the principle of function extensionality are
somewhat different from those of [3]; they are informed by his investigations [2] into
two-dimensional semantics for type theory. In this semantics, dependent product for-
mation is required to be a (suitably weak) two-dimensional right adjoint to reindexing;
and in order for the semantics to be complete, we must verify that the syntactic model
has this property—which requires the imposition of some form of function extensionality.
However, whilst preparing [2], it became apparent to the author that the usual formula-
tion of function extensionality is insufficient for this purpose because it fails to verify a
number of necessary propositional equalities between identity proofs. In the setting of [3],
the existence of these propositional equalities is assured by the principle of uniqueness
of identity proofs; yet for a higher-dimensional semantics it is crucial that we do not
have uniqueness of identity proofs, whose imposition would allow only trivial, posetal,
models to be formed. Thus it is of interest to determine how function extensionality
should correctly be formulated when we do not have uniqueness of identity proofs; and it
is this that we shall now do. We work in the fragment of type theory given by the iden-
tity types and the app-formulation of dependent products. In order to minimize clutter,
we also allow ourselves the notational convenience of writing function application f(x)
simply as fx, and λ-abstraction λ(f) simply as λf . We begin by recording some useful
consequences of function extensionality.
5.2. Proposition: In the presence of Π-ext and Π-ext-comp, the rules Π-prop-η and
Π-prop-η-comp of Proposition 3.6 are definable.
Proof. Given m : Π(A,B), we must exhibit a term η(m) : IdΠ(A,B)(m, λx.m · x). So
we define n = λx.m · x : Π(A,B); and by Π-β have that n · x = (λx.m · x) · x = m · x
whenever x : A. We may now define η(m) := ext
(
m, n, λx. r(m · x)
)
; and moreover,
when m = λf for some f : (x : A)B(x), the β-rule implies that m = n, so that
η(λf) = ext(λf, λf, λ(rf)) = r(λf) as required. 
5.3. Proposition: In the presence of Π-ext and Π-ext-comp, the following proposi-
tional ξ-rules are definable:
f, g : (x : A)B(x) p : (x : A) IdB(x)(fx, gx)
ξ(f, g, p) : IdΠ(A,B)(λf, λg)
Π-prop-ξ,
f : (x : A)B(x)
ξ(f, f, rf) = r(λf) : IdΠ(A,B)(λf, λf)
Π-prop-ξ-comp.
Proof. Given f , g and p as in the hypotheses of Π-prop-ξ, we consider m = λf and
n = λg in Π(A,B). By the β-rule, we may view p as a term
x : A ⊢ p(x) : IdB(x)(m · x, n · x);
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and hence may define ξ(f, g, p) = ext(λf, λg, λp). Moreover, we have that ξ(f, f, rf) =
ext(λf, λf, λ(rf)) = r(λf) as required. 
In fact, we have a converse to the previous two propositions:
5.4. Proposition: In the presence of the rules Π-prop-η and Π-prop-η-comp of Propo-
sition 3.6 and the rules Π-prop-ξ and Π-prop-ξ-comp of Proposition 5.3, the function
extensionality rules Π-ext and Π-ext-comp are definable.
Proof. Recall from [6] that, in the presence of dependent products, the identity types
admit an operation which one may think of as either transitivity or composition:
p : IdA(a1, a2) q : IdA(a2, a3)
q ◦ p : IdA(a1, a3)
Id-trans,
p : IdA(a1, a2)
p ◦ r(a1) = p : IdA(a1, a2)
Id-trans-comp;
and also an operation which one may think of as either symmetry or inverse:
p : IdA(a1, a2)
p−1 : IdA(a2, a1)
Id-symm,
a : A
r(a)−1 = r(a) : IdA(a, a)
Id-symm-comp.
Now suppose that we are given terms m, n and k as in the hypotheses of Π-ext. We
begin by defining terms
f := [x : A]m · x : (x : A)B(x)
g := [x : A]n · x : (x : A)B(x)
and p := [x : A] k · x : (x : A) IdB(x)(fx, gx).
Observe that the third of these is well-typed by virtue of the first two. Applying the
propositional ξ-rule, we obtain a term
ξ(f, g, p) : IdΠ(A,B)(λf, λg) = IdΠ(A,B)
(
λx.m · x, λx. n · x
)
.
But from the propositional η-rule and Id-symmetry rule, we have terms
η(m) : IdΠ(A,B)(m, λx.m · x) and η(n)
−1 : IdΠ(A,B)(λx. n · x, n)
and now can define ext(m,n, p) := η(n)−1 ◦
(
ξ(f, g, p) ◦ η(m)
)
: IdΠ(A,B)(m,n). In the
case where m = n = λh and p = λ(rh) we have by the β-rule that f = g = h, and so we
may calculate that
ext(λh, λh, λ(rh)) = η(λh)−1 ◦
(
ξ(h, h, rh) ◦ η(λh)
)
= r(λh)−1 ◦
(
r(λh) ◦ r(λh)
)
= r(λh)
as required. 
Thus relative to the theory with identity types plus the app-formulation of dependent
products, the function extensionality principle is equivalent2 with the conjunction of the
propositional η- and propositional ξ-rules; and relative to the theory with identity types
plus the funsplit formulation of dependent products, function extensionality is equivalent
with the propositional ξ-rule.
2Again, in a propositional, rather than definitional, sense.
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5.5. We now wish to describe the inadequacies of function extensionality in the absence
of uniqueness of identity proofs. These arise from its failure to continue a characteristic
trend in intensional type theory, namely that nearly every statement that one may think
should hold about the identity types, does hold. For instance, in the proof of Propo-
sition 5.4, we saw that the identity types IdA come equipped with operations which
we called composition and inverse. We would hope for this composition to be associa-
tive and unital, and for the inverse operation to really provide compositional inverses;
and a straightforward application of Id-elimination shows this to be the case, at least
when we interpret associativity, unitality and invertibility in an “up-to-propositional-
equality” sense. Similarly, each judgement x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x) induces a judgement
x, y : A, p : IdA(x, y) ⊢ f˜(p) : IdB(x)(fx, fy) which we would expect to be suitably
“functorial” in p: and again, an application of Id-elimination confirms this, providing us
with canonical propositional equalities between f˜(q ◦ p) and f˜(q) ◦ f˜(p). However, when
it comes to function extensionality, there are a number of statements which intuitively
should be true but which seem to be impossible to prove. Here are two typical examples.
5.6. Examples:
(1) Using Id-elimination we can derive a rule
m, n : Π(A,B) p : IdΠ(A,B)(m,n) a : A
p ∗ a : IdB(a)(m · a, n · a)
satisfying r(m)∗a = r(m ·a), which expresses that any two propositionally equal
elements of a Π-type are pointwise propositionally equal. We would expect that
for k : Πx : A. IdB(x)(m · x, n · x) and a : A, we should have k · a propositionally
equal to ext(m,n, k) ∗ a; yet this seems impossible to prove.
(2) Suppose given terms ℓ,m, n : Π(A,B) and proofs f : (x : A) IdB(x)(ℓ · x, m · x)
and g : (x : A) IdB(x)(m · x, n · x). Let us write g ◦ f for the term [x : A] gx ◦ fx.
It now seems to be impossible to verify a propositional equality between the
elements
ext(m,n, λg) ◦ ext(ℓ,m, λf) and ext(ℓ, n, λ(g ◦ f))
of IdΠ(A,B)(ℓ, n).
5.7. The reason that we encounter these problems is essentially the following. We
would like to construct the desired propositional equalities by eliminating over the type
u, v : Π(A,B) ⊢ Πx : A. IdB(x)(u · x, v · x). To do this we need an elimination rule that
we do not have, one which says that this type is generated by elements of the form
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(λf, λf, λ(rf)). In light of this, we propose that function extensionality should be re-
placed with just such an elimination rule. We consider the following two rules:
u, v : Π(A,B), w : Πx : A. IdB(x)(u · x, v · x) ⊢ C(u, v, w) type
f : (x : A)B(x) ⊢ d(f) : C(λf, λf, λ(rf))
m,n : Π(A,B) k : Πx : A. IdB(x)(m · x, n · x)
L(d,m, n, k) : C(m,n, k)
Π-Id-elim,
u, v : Π(A,B), w : Πx : A. IdB(x)(u · x, v · x) ⊢ C(u, v, w) type
f : (x : A)B(x) ⊢ d(f) : C(λf, λf, λ(rf)) h : (x : A)B(x)
L(d, λh, λh, λ(rh)) = d(h) : C(λh, λh, λ(rh))
Π-Id-comp.
Observe that these two rules are once again higher-order inference rules. We will return to
this point in §5.11 below. Let us first show that these rules entail function extensionality.
5.8. Proposition: In the presence of identity types, the app-formulation of Π-types and
the rules Π-Id-elim and Π-Id-comp of §5.7, it is possible to define the function exten-
sionality rules Π-ext and Π-ext-comp.
Proof. For each u, v : Π(A,B) and w : Πx : A. IdB(x)(u · x, v · x) we define a type
C(u, v, w) := IdΠ(A,B)(u, v); and now for each f : (x : A)B(x), we define an element
d(f) := r(λf) : C(λf, λf, λ(rf)). Applying Π-Id-elimination, we obtain the judgement
m, n : Π(A,B) k : Πx : A. IdB(x)(m · x, n · x)
ext(m,n, k) := L(d,m, n, k) : IdΠ(A,B)(m,n)
;
and calculate that ext(λf, λf, λ(rf)) = L(d, λf, λf, λ(rf)) = d(f) = r(λf) as required.

Thus the Π-Id-elimination rules are stronger than the function extensionality rules,
and we conjecture that they are strictly stronger. To prove this would require either
finding a new model of type theory that supports function extensionality but not Π-
Id-elimination—new, because every semantic model of which the author is aware that
supports the former, also supports the latter—or giving a syntactic proof along the lines
of that given for Theorem 4.2. In both cases, the author’s efforts have proven fruitless.
Setting aside this issue, let us now show that the Π-Id-elimination rules allow us to give
positive answers to the question posed in Examples 5.6.
5.9. Proposition: In the presence of identity types, the app-formulation of Π-types and
the rules Π-Id-elim and Π-Id-comp of §5.7, the following rules are definable:
m, n : Π(A,B) k : Πx : A. IdB(x)(m · x, n · x) a : A
µ(m,n, k, a) : IdIdB(a)(m·a, n·a)
(
ext(m,n, k) ∗ a, k · a
) Π-ext-app,
f : (x : A)B(x)
µ(λf, λf, λ(rf), a) = r(rfa) : IdIdB(a)(fa,fa)
(
rfa, rfa
) Π-ext-app-comp,
where ∗ is the operation defined in Examples 5.6(1).
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Proof. For each u, v : Π(A,B) and w : Πx : A. IdB(x)(u · x, v · x) we define a type
C(u, v, w) := Πx : A. IdIdB(x)(u·x,v·x)
(
ext(u, v, w) ∗ x, w · x
)
. Now for f : (x : A)B(x), we
calculate that
C(λf, λf, λ(rf)) = Πx : A. IdIdB(x)(fx,fx)
(
ext(λf, λf, λ(rf)) ∗ x, rfx
)
= Πx : A. IdIdB(x)(fx,fx)
(
r(λf) ∗ x, rfx
)
= Πx : A. IdIdB(x)(fx,fx)
(
rfx, rfx
)
so that we may define d(f) := λx. r(rfx) : C(λf, λf, λ(rf)). An application of Π-Id-
elimination now yields the judgement Π-ext-app by taking
µ(m,n, k, a) := L(d,m, n, k) · a : IdIdB(a)(m·a,n·a)
(
ext(m,n, k) ∗ a, k · a
)
.
Finally, we compute that µ(λf, λf, λ(rf), a) = λx. r(rfx) · a = r(rfa) as required. 
5.10. Proposition: In the presence of identity types, the app-formulation of Π-types and
the rules Π-Id-elim and Π-Id-comp of §5.7, the following rule is definable:
ℓ, m, n : Π(A,B) f : (x : A) IdB(x)(ℓ · x,m · x) g : (x : A) IdB(x)(m · x, n · x)
ν(f, g) : IdIdΠ(A,B)(ℓ,n)
(
ext(m,n, λg) ◦ ext(ℓ,m, λf), ext(ℓ, n, λ(g ◦ f))
)
Proof. It suffices to derive the rule:
ℓ, m, n : Π(A,B) j : Πx : A. IdB(x)(ℓ · x,m · x) k : Πx : A. IdB(x)(m · x, n · x)
ν ′(j, k) : IdIdΠ(A,B)(ℓ,n)
(
ext(m,n, k) ◦ ext(ℓ,m, j), ext(ℓ, n, λx. k · x ◦ j · x)
)
since the required result then follows by taking j := λf and k := λg. But applying the
rule of Π-Id-elimination on k, it suffices to derive this rule in the case where m = n = λh
and k = λ(rh); which is to show that
ℓ : Π(A,B) h : (x : A)B(x) j : Πx : A. IdB(x)(ℓ · x, hx)
ν ′(j, λ(rh)) : IdIdΠ(A,B)(λh,n)
(
ext(λh, λh, λ(rh)) ◦ ext(ℓ, λh, j),
ext(ℓ, λh, λx. r(hx) ◦ j · x)
)
is derivable. But we have that r(hx) ◦ j · x = j · x and that ext(λh, λh, λ(rh)) = r(λh) so
that ext(λh, λh, λ(rh)) ◦ ext(ℓ, λh, j) = ext(ℓ, λh, j): so that it suffices to show that
ℓ : Π(A,B) h : (x : A)B(x) j : Πx : A. IdB(x)(ℓ · x, hx)
ν ′(j, λ(rh)) : IdIdΠ(A,B)(λh,n)
(
ext(ℓ, λh, j), ext(ℓ, λh, λx. j · x)
)
is derivable. Now, using the propositional η-rule, we can derive a term η(j) witnessing
the propositional equality of j and λx. j · x; and we will be done if we can lift this to a
propositional equality between ext(ℓ, λh, j) and ext(ℓ, λh, λx. j · x). But we may do this
using the following rule:
a, b : Π(A,B) c, d : Πx : A. IdB(x)(a · x, b · x) p : IdΠx:A. IdB(x)(a·x,b·x)(c, d)
e˜xt(p) : IdIdΠ(A,B)
(
ext(a, b, c), ext(a, b, d)
)
,
which is derivable by Id-elimination on p. 
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In Section 4, we saw that the higher-order formulation of Π-types can be restated in
a first-order manner; and the final result of this paper will do something similar for the
Π-Id-elimination rule.
5.11. Proposition: In the presence of the identity types; the app-formulation of Π-types;
the function extensionality rules Π-ext and Π-ext-comp; and the rules Π-ext-app and
Π-ext-app-comp of Proposition 5.9, we can define the rules Π-Id-elim and Π-Id-comp
of §5.7.
Proof. Suppose that we are given terms
u, v : Π(A,B), w : Πx : A. IdB(x)(u · x, v · x) ⊢ C(u, v, w) type
f : (x : A)B(x) ⊢ d(f) : C(λf, λf, λ(rf))
m,n : Π(A,B) k : Πx : A. IdB(x)(m · x, n · x)
as in the premisses of Π-Id-elim. We must find an element L(d,m, n, k) : C(m,n, k).
We will employ much the same method as we did in the proof of Proposition 3.7, though
the details will be a little more complicated. We begin by constructing the element
d([x : A]m · x) : C(λx.m · x, λx.m · x, λx. r(m · x)); and the remainder of the proof will
involve applying various substitutions to this element until we obtain the required element
of C(m,n, k). The key result we need is the following lemma.
Lemma. We may define a rule:
(⋆)
u, v : Π(A,B) p : IdΠ(A,B)(u, v) c : C(λx. u · x, λx. u · x, λx. r(u · x))
φ(p, c) : C(u, v, λx. p ∗ x)
satisfying φ
(
r(λf), c
)
= c.
Before proving this, let us see how it allows us to derive the required element of
C(m,n, k). Using function extensionality we can form ext(m,n, k) : IdΠ(A,B)(m,n); and
so by applying φ to this and d([x : A]m · x) can obtain an element
b(m,n, k) := φ
(
ext(m,n, k), d([x : A]m · x)
)
: C(m,n, λx. ext(m,n, k) ∗ x).
We now make use of the rule Π-ext-app of Proposition 5.9, which provides us with a
term
x : A ⊢ µ(m,n, k, x) : IdIdB(x)(m·x, n·x)
(
ext(m,n, k) ∗ x, k · x
)
;
applying function extensionality to which yields a term
p(m,n, k) := ext(λx. ext(m,n, k) ∗ x, k, λx. µ(m,n, k, x)
)
: IdΠx:A. IdB(x)(m·x, n·x)(λx. ext(m,n, k) ∗ x, k).
The final step is to use the Leibnitz rule defined in the proof of Proposition 3.7 to
form the required term L(d,m, n, k) := subst(p(m,n, k), b(m,n, k)) : C(m,n, k). We
are also required to show that L(d, λf, λf, λ(rf)) = d(f). For this, we first note that
b(λf, λf, λ(rf)) = φ(r(λf), d(f)) = d(f) : C(λf, λf, λ(rf)). Next we observe that
µ(λf, λf, λ(rf), x) = r(rfx) so that we have
p(λf, λf, λ(rf)) = ext
(
λx. r(λf) ∗ x, λ(rf), λx. r(rfx)
)
= ext
(
λ(rf), λ(rf), λ(rrf)
)
= r(λ(rf))
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so that L(d, λf, λf, λ(rf)) = subst(r(λ(rf)), d(f)) = d(f) as required.
It remains only to prove the Lemma. We will derive (⋆) by Id-elimination on p, for
which it suffices to consider the case where u = v and p = r(u). So we must show that
u : Π(A,B) c : C(λx. u · x, λx. u · x, λx. r(u · x))
φ(r(u), c) : C(u, u, λx. r(u) ∗ x)
is derivable; which in turn we may do by Π-elimination on u. Indeed, when we have
u = λf for some f : (x : A)B(x), we find that C(λx. u · x, λx. u · x, λx. r(u · x)) =
C(λf, λf, λ(rf)) = C(u, u, λx. r(u) ∗ x) so that we may take φ(r(λf), c) = c. 
5.12. We end the paper with an informal discussion of the adequacy of our strengthening
of the principle of function extensionality. We have portrayed it as a necessary strength-
ening, but we have not indicated why we think it sufficient: could there not be yet more
exotic propositional equalities of the sort considered in Examples 5.6 which our Π-Id-
elimination rule cannot verify? The reason the author believes this not to be the case
is essentially semantic. As mentioned in §5.1, if we wish to describe higher-dimensional
categorical semantics for type theory in which Π-type formation is a (suitably weak)
right adjoint to reindexing, then we need a form of function extensionality. As it turns
out, the Π-Id-elimination rule given above is just what is needed to make this go through.
The author has verified the details of this for two-dimensional models in [2], and has
sketched them for a putative theory of three-dimensional models. Moreover, there is a
general argument which suggests that this extends to all higher dimensions, which runs
as follows.
When we form higher-dimensional models of type theory, we obtain the higher di-
mensionality from the identity type structure. In order for Π-type formation to provide
a weak right adjoint to pullback, it must respect the higher-dimensionality, and hence
the identity type structure. Now, if we are given A type and x : A ⊢ B(x) type, then
dependent product formation over x : A sends the identity type
x : A, y, z : B(x) ⊢ IdB(x)(y, z) type
to the type
m,n : Π(A,B) ⊢ Πx : A. IdB(x)(m · x, n · x) type;
and to say that function space formation preserves the identity type structure is to say
that this latter type should act like an identity type for Π(A,B); and it precisely this
which is expressed by our elimination rule Π-Id-elim.
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